

1972

PEDRO NEVES MARQUES

1972. It is common sense by now, as much sensorially as rationally, measured by way of statistical calculation and modelled probability; we know, it is over. The world ended in 1972.

Since then, our postmortem condition has offered us nothing short of a catastrophe: climate change and the economic deregulation of both human and inhuman labour—the environment itself put to profit and value destruction. It is not that the catastrophe is coming, or that it has been looming since 1972. Rather, it is already here. It is just taking longer than expected to process. That it may be so can be demonstrated by the perpetuation of the catastrophe as the imaginary limit of current critique and of ecological awareness. Struggling for survival in a sort of cybernetic purgatory, critique loops endlessly in déjà-vu, fantasising at each turn the quality of the

catastrophe. This condition has nothing to do with postmodernism. It is just that 1972 has already happened, yet, like 1968, it never ceases to keep on coming back.¹

The following are three retrospective reviews of the tipping point: not the catastrophe's point of no return—are we actually past it?—but of the 'uncanny valley'. In other words, these are three examples of the standstill of contemporary models of critique, its threshold perhaps. These are also examples of the freedom and instrumentality of theory, its virality. And they may be read together or separately. Some might say we are lacking the imagination of a future. This is paradoxical. The future is everywhere, in our past and in our present. Rather, the question is: if indeed capitalism comes from the future, why don't we?²

I

THE SHAPE OF THE WORLD AT THE END OF THE WORLD

1972. *The Limits to Growth* is the postmodern oracle. The book was the first world report on the human environment. Backed by The Club of Rome (a gathering of entrepreneurs and financiers concerned with the ecological impact of worldwide industrialisation) and headed by an MIT project team, it made explicit the long-term consequences of exponential economic growth.³ Against the ingrained faith in growth found at both Left and Right of the economic spectrum, from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, it stated that if habits did not change, the industry did not revolutionise and the ways of ecology

were not followed, in the next 50 to 100 years the limits of the Earth's resources would be reached, and most of its catastrophic predictions would be unavoidable. A world socio-economic-environmental crunch would be felt everywhere: natural resources would deplete, food crops fail, pollution rise out of control, population increase, and the environment falter—all of which leading to a rather sudden collapse. Through its lens, the future offered no surprises. Rather, such collapse was a cybernetic certainty. Midway along the predict path—the report's temporal spectrum runs from 1900 to 2100—it still is, but in more ways

than the report itself could foresee. In response, it proposed a philosophy of de-growth and a managerial-based economy of homeostasis, where the ins and outs of the reproductive feedback loops would even themselves out to stability.

Made to be a best-seller, which it was, *The Limits to Growth* was published as a reader-friendly paperback so that its contents—the imaginary, the mode and model of action, a generalised though precise return of futurology (we have not abandoned it since)—could be made accessible to all. Predictably, its tone was that of alarm and its shape that of a warning. Yet its logic relied on the rigorous theoretical models of systems analysis, statistics and mathematical projection which were developed earlier in the 1960s by Jay Forrester at the MIT Sloan School of Management and immediately applied to corporate management.

With its scientific lexicon and meta-model structure, *The Limits to Growth* may very well be the first (and last) post-apocalyptic fiction—made more horrific for being real, closing the door on 1950s alien invasion narratives and initiating a whole new genre of environmental violence and repentance. As a grand narrative of planetary scope, it delivered a narrative fit for globalisation, answering back to the illusions of the Great Acceleration and finding its readers in the comforted Baby Boom Generation. *They* were the population bomb, and it was of them, of their actions and economy, even of their (and their children's) future that the book talked about.

This was the essence of *The Limits to Growth* futurology: ecologically aware—‘everything is in everything’—discursively catastrophic, and mathematically guaranteed. And if its answer was a phase shift towards an homeostatic management of ‘green’ resources and an even distribution of wealth, this meant applying to the present the ecosystemic methods used in the production of the report itself. This was done in such a way that, if in the long run its political premises ended up failing—as is evident by the palpable reality of the report's predicament forty years on—the model would not. And the latter, as its application in economics came to show, is as much political as the former.⁴

Despite stating itself as the first ‘deregulation’ of systems dynamics from its usual application in

corporate management, it was in fact corporate management that best understood the full scope of the report—not the contents, but rather the method. Theoretically, *The Limits to Growth* opened the way for managerial prediction on a global scale, expanding economic markets in the inclusion of the virtual and placing model-engineering as a predominant factor in the administration of life and value creation. But, rather than equilibrium, it was the catastrophe itself that was taken in, in the optimisation of targeting and pre-emption techniques. The result has been an hijacking of the future by the algorithmics of technocratic management. And, along with the future, any sense of a political present. The book's subtitle said it all: “A report for The Club of Rome's project on the predicament of mankind”.

Postmodernism narrated to us the disempowerment of the worker's will to the future, the Marxist motto that if the future is indeed in the making it is due to the worker's labour and revolutionary dreams. Postmodernism told us that there was ‘no future’, and in a certain sense this was a statement *The Limits to Growth* also adhered to. For, although futurological in essence, *The Limits to Growth* emphasised the present instead, in terms of responsibility for the future and of the necessity of maintaining a sustainable state equilibrium contrary to the acceleration of industrial capitalism. Such controlled de-growth policy quickly became entrenched in the imaginary of the Left, contributing to its reversal, forty years on, to the conservative side of the political spectrum, and ultimately to its powerlessness before the automated acceleration of the economy and of social reproduction under financial capitalism.

In any case, by 1972 de-growth and the systemic management of the present was already proven wrong. By then the future was already in the making, but only theoretically and under the exclusivity of new technocratic models of projection—and more so due to *The Limits to Growth*. In this sense, it is poignant that Jean-François Lyotard saw “in science and scientific research proper” the aesthetic modernism's “infinite capacity for innovation, change, break, renewal, which will infuse the otherwise repressive

system with the disalienating excitement of the new and the ‘unknown’.”⁵ From this point of view, *The Limits to Growth* may very well have been the most avant-garde, most enduring, and most definitely futuristic—though dystopian—event of

the postmodern shift. Following the postmodern trend for lingering sequels, *The Limits to Growth* has had two follow-ups since 1972.⁶ It is now preparing its 40th year update, and promises to keep on delivering.

II

THE GREAT ACCELERATION?

1972. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari publish their much debated first collaboration *Anti-Oedipus*—a theoretical enterprise out of the Baby Boom and into the many. The book is perhaps the first postmodern chapter on the history of revolutionary capitalism.⁷ And if in time it came to perform a latent ambiguity in terms of its political alliances, the cause may be as much the revolutionary origins of capitalism itself (a genealogy that, once traced, blurs all possible political divides) as its postmodern quality (which would retrospectively portray capitalism as always having been postmodern in potency).

A summarisation is necessary. In the author’s own words, the book should function as a manual for surviving under capitalism: a strategy the authors would stress further with their 1980 follow-up *A Thousand Plateaus*. This implied not only a knowledge of the substance of capitalism—which the book provides—but also the ambiguity therein, that is, the tension between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary—which, as stated, the book actually came to perform. Desire, no longer taken as a ‘lack’ but as an inhuman, immanent ‘production of production’ would be the substance from which both capitalism and revolutionary politics would stem from—their difference relying only on their attachments and distribution.⁸ Portrayed as an energised process of creative expansion and growth, it would put the body to work in all sorts of re-combinatory machines upon which capital then invests. This investment momentarily linearises (or codifies) desire under the writing of collective constitutions (social; economic;

technological; ontological), inscribing laws and morals into the body/psyche of the citizen only to continuously break them down at the speed of desire’s new forms. This double process leads to temporary plateaus of productivity and accumulated profit, which once saturated collapse under their own weight and wealth. Out of the collapse, desire escapes formlessly into new shapes and investments, while capitalism grows along with its own crisis. The frontiers of politics are redefined.

According to *Anti-Oedipus*, capitalist society emerges out of this tension between constraint and escape, control and expansion, to the extent that social production and desiring production become the same. Yet desire is the *limit* of the social; a limit forced to break by the need of capitalism to expand ever further, that is, due to its coupling with desire’s unboundedness. Capitalism is ever expanding due to its commitment to keep up the rate of profit; it has no exterior limit, for it reproduces itself by displacing its own site—it *is* its own exterior limit.⁹ It is in this sense that, in *Anti-Oedipus*, capitalism appears out of history as fully revolutionary.¹⁰ It is the tendency that breaks with the state order, parasitising on new forms of desire and on possible political escape routes, ever tracing the revolutionary, and spiralling away from the given order: beyond the correlationism between the interior and the exterior, the I and the Other, the real and the virtual.¹¹ Hence the morphing of capitalism with revolutionary politics: “the deep secret of capital-as-process is its incommensurability with the preservation of bourgeois civilisation.”¹²

So what is the solution? Which is the revolutionary path? (...) To withdraw from the world market, as Samir Amin advises Third World countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist “economic solution”? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and a practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to ‘accelerate the process,’ (...) It should therefore be said that one can never go far enough in the direction of deterritorialization: *you haven’t seen anything yet* (...) we cry out, ‘More perversion! More artifice!’—to a point where the earth becomes so artificial that the movement of deterritorialization creates of necessity and by itself a new earth.¹³

If capitalism operates at two-way velocities, coding and decoding, ever marking the frontiers of politics, politics should investigate the investments of capital, its solidification and decompression sites and its tendencies (and along with it the tendencies of desire and of the revolution). But it should not stop at a psychoanalysis of capitalism; rather it must adhere to the crisis of capital, to accelerate it, to allow desire to flow.¹⁴ This would imply joining capitalism’s chaotic velocity, to accelerate it even further, finding in its energetic dissipation and at each breaking engine of the capitalism+state macrostructure new and uncompromising spaces of life hurtling towards the unknown.

Decades later, in the midst of the digitisation of the world via the www and the dot.com explosion¹⁵, Nick Land would accuse Deleuze and Guattari of backing away from this accelerationist perspective on the capitalism/politics relation in *A Thousand Plateaus*, turning instead to a cybernetic type of equilibrium between rupture and control, verification and capture. In any case, the spark was ignited: growth proceeds with greater complexity. And on the side of political action this is still the critical tendency that still dominates cyberpolitics (in the www or otherwise). Think of Anonymous, and think of copyright issues. Or think of nanotechnology, or the creativity of unemployment, and the destruction of labour, or of financial high-speed

trading, or the ontological collapse humanity is verging into—because, again, laws are crumbling as capitalism moves and re-equates the distribution of life. New markets are opening up.¹⁶

In contrast to *The Limits to Growth*, the catastrophe is welcomed, for it is necessary for meltdown. Politically, one must inhabit it, contribute to it. Capitalism is what links us to the future, or better yet, it comes *from* the future to steal our dreams, command our actions. If capitalism is revolutionary it is due to a demand by future forms on present hierarchical shapes—“it discovers that the future as virtuality is accessible now, according to a mode of machinic adjacency that *securitized* social reality is compelled to repress.”¹⁷ The future is the principle of capitalism, and capitalism the principle of revolution. *Anti-Oedipus* may have been futurological itself in emulating its own discourse—“it is already engaging with nonlinear nano-engineering runaway in 1972 (...) schizoanalysis was only possible because we are hurtling into the first globally integrated insanity: politics is obsolete. *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* hacked into a future that programs it down to its punctuation, connecting with the imminent inevitability of viral revolution”¹⁸ But it was also by not projecting itself in the future that *Anti-Oedipus* failed its own revealed paradox: “capital cannot disown schizoanalysis without de-fanging itself. The madness it would fend off is the sole resource of its future.”¹⁹

This is why with accelerationism neoliberalism appears ever progressive, while the Left is placed in the paradoxical position of the conservatives, struggling to maintain the ‘order’ of social cohesion, to keep the past intact. In fact, this is a tension over the instrumentality of the future for politics: either the promise of bottom-up revolutionary upheaval on the part of the workers or the revolutionary essence of destructive crisis-capitalism (neoliberalism being its latest and most compelling form). “You haven’t seen anything yet,” goes the accelerationist motto. But so does the neoliberal one.

Well, since 1972 we have seen a lot. And mostly we have seen the operative, as much as the adaptive qualities of neoliberalism’s ‘expand & privatise’ strategies. Capitalist acceleration and

expansion (and there is only a capitalist version of it) means continuous growth; and in following capitalism's push towards the exterior it is an ecological disaster. But it also means privatisation.²⁰ And this is the instrumental paradox neoliberalism may have learned from 1972. On the one hand, it accelerates life, opens up the markets, dismantles social structures, but ironically it is all under the excuse of crisis prevention: if not *this* then *that*; if the markets don't open up then the catastrophe will come, all will crumble. The future cannot come. On the other hand, it privatises the past, represses citizenship (while simultaneously advocating individual entrepreneurship), and monopolises wealth creating a new top-down social order. At this point, it is the people who desire acceleration, for the catastrophe to come,

to finally get us through it. So that the world can be built anew. Where is the future? the people ask. The problem is that, once there, there is no longer a world to be built, for social structures have been stolen, privatised, and a monopoly has installed itself on the present. Instrumentally, neoliberalism betrays itself from the start, recycling itself on the power of the people.

“Reaching an escape velocity of self-reinforcing machinic intelligence propagation, the forces of production are going for the revolution on their own.”²¹ This is the myth of accelerationism: technological acceleration brings meltdown and with it the germination of a sort of animistic, anarchic, autonomous life. A new Earth. To a certain extent this is true, but the truth in it proves nothing.

III

THE EDUCATIONAL COMPLEX

1972. Ecosystems theory takes a corporate turn in the small Swiss city of St. Gallen. Across the Atlantic, spreading out from MIT Sloan School of Management it was becoming standard procedure, but in Europe it was still something of a novelty, at least at the educational level.²² In 1972 the University of St. Gallen Institute of Management publishes Hans Ulrich and Walter Krieg's handbook *The St. Gallen Management Model* which would come to define the programme's singularity. Of academic interest and for internal use at the institute the publication has lived in its own niche, yet it marks a significant turn in management studies. Two years before, Hans Ulrich had already written the book *Die Unternehmung als Produktives Soziales System* (“The Corporation as a Productive Social System”). The title is telling, and highlights both the organic quality the model would attribute to corporations and the corporatisation of ecological systems it would follow through.

Updated by the subsequent staff, the model has characterised the school's management programme for forty years now, affirming the

institute's place in European economic circles.²³ Its prominent quality has been its *integrative* approach to systems management, with the original integration of cybernetics and ecosystemics in the 1970s at its core. Taken as techniques of model making themselves, with their loop mechanisms, holistic cartographies and environmental concern (which ecology also built upon), these research fields have allowed the St. Gallen Management Model to fuse ecology with economics, optimisation and control. Its consequences may very well have taken 40 years to be everywhere felt: now that the Earth itself, in and beyond environmental issues, has become a stakeholder, and complex techniques of projection and preemption (what Brian Massumi has termed ‘ontopower’) unfold across all macro and micro-levels of society.²⁴

By 1972 though, “business schools were organised along disciplinary lines (i.e. the chairs, research groups and institutes specialised in certain functions such as production, marketing, personnel, etc.) or methodological compounds

(e.g. decision making, organising, accounting).”²⁵ Instead, the St. Gallen Management Model “conceived systems thinking as *holistic, process-oriented, interdisciplinary, analytic and synthetic* at the same time” all of which without ceasing to be “*pragmatic* (i.e. issue- or problem-focused, not discipline-focused).”²⁶ By holistic the model meant not only a comprehensive awareness of all internal and external influences that may impact the development of management models, be they corporate, governmental or natural, but also the inclusion of accidents and unpredictabilities—its integrative approach. Only a “process-oriented perspective of firms”, with no set goal or endpoint to its internal structure or cohesion, is capable of coping with this instability, reaching out (inter-disciplinarily) across the ecosystems. This highlights the ecological basis the model emulated. At the surface it may appear only as a concern for sustainability, but at a more structural level, one should highlight the *resilience* of management models to crisis and their attention to *value in differentiation*. In contrast to ecological economics, such resilience does not stop at climate issues, nano-glitches or inhuman participation, but extends more widely into an analysis of difference as structural for model dynamics and the overall practice of management.

The framework’s goal of “mastering complexity” could thus be read as the inclusion of all stakeholders (and not only shareholders), *real or virtual, past, present and future*. In concordance with *The Limits to Growth* team, this would extend as far as the natural environment and the Earth.²⁷ Such inclusion followed Ashby’s cybernetic rule that “only variety can absorb variety”²⁸ and, again, this includes *everything* and *everyone inside and outside*. This implies a whole cartographic technique, crossing the boundaries of ontology and agency throughout ecosystemic relations. Since it is a matter of cartographic metamodeling, it also means attributing productive roles to all entities in the schema, be they real or virtual. Such scope of integration builds the model multidimensionally in relays extending backwards and forwards in time to the rhythm of each and every agency involved, in a comprehensive gesture from here to becoming. The consequences are far-reaching and premonitory. Time itself

becomes the time of relations between agencies, that is between stakeholders, and no longer subsumed to a modern chronological linearity anchored on causality. This may very well be the basis for what the St. Gallen Model now terms its *interpretative* turn, which could be read as an euphemism for the construction of a preemptive process towards critique—and I do not mean this pejoratively.²⁹ The future is not programmed, and yet it is prepared for. Everything that is and is yet (with probability) to come enters the scope of management. The past, the present and the future matter not as temporal markers but only as conceptual agents of production; catalysers of ecological processes to be analysed and apportioned. The accident is expected, even willed for if necessary: it is always already here—projected and accounted for.

This is why metamodelling could only be *synthetic*: not only predictions but a world in itself (many worlds!) emerges. In the last instance, the model (and management at large) neither serves moral equilibrium [homeostasis] nor avoids metabolic hypertrophy [acceleration]—both scenarios allowed so long as they follow “the harmonisation of strategic programs (or more generally ‘activities’), structure, and culture (or more generally ‘attitudes’) to a common chord”: maximum efficiency in profit.³⁰

The story of the St. Gallen Management Model may very well be that of the afterlife of ecological theories, or rather of their practical success. It is not the story of ecological struggles though. In what concerns ecology, since its scientific birth in the 1920s and more so by 1972, economic management and energetic sustainability, if not downright mathematical rationalism, were integral to it, and a certain technocratic tendency has been present throughout. While ecological utopia faltered throughout the 1970s, it was nonetheless made successful, but not where ecological revolutionaries might expect. Someone was paying attention and learned the lesson—at St. Gallen authors such as Bertalanffy and Wiener, Forrester and Beer are essential reading; the model even managed to cope with the tumult raised by late twentieth-century theories of complexity and chaos.³¹ In contrast to popular

environmentalism—perhaps the last, most philosophically narrow, refuge of political ecology—this was a silent revolution, located within the walls of elite educational institutions and small scale think tanks from which it rose, systemically aware, to the redefinition of early twenty-first-century economic and political structures.³² Out of ecology and into bio-economics, integrative process-based pedagogic institutions such as in St. Gallen spearheaded the creation of ‘sustainable’ or ‘reliable’ models, not of the present or the future, but of connectivity and influence. Simultaneously an objective and a method, such model design is a practical example of applied holism and network thinking, from the sciences to the humanities, subsuming time and life itself to the technique of projections and tendencies in a corporate twist of the promise laid down by *The Limits to Growth* or of any accelerative escape route. As the St. Gallen Institute of Management shows, pedagogic institutions are preponderant places of practical and theoretical fusion. One should care to it.

NOTES

¹ ‘Welcome to the Anthropocene’ announced Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations—giant projection at the 2012 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Is this not 1972 revisited, and rebranded anew under the economic excuse of bio-engineering? And what about Gaia? Did anyone remember to ask it if it would like to join in too? Also: the 1968 comparison is taken from a comment by anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.

² The sentence is from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, stated in the 1972 book *Anti-Oedipus* and repeated emphatically by Nick Land all throughout the 1990s.

³ Members of The Club of Rome ranged from heads of firms such as Fiat and Olivetti to directors of research institutes such as the Japan Economic Research Center and the Battele Institute in Geneva. The MIT project team was headed by Dennis L. Meadows.

⁴ Tiqqun has provided perhaps the most radical answer to this politicization of cybernetics I know of, but for a more systematic approach to the subject I’d recommend James Beniger’s more obscure *Control Revolution* from 1989.

⁵ Fredric Jameson, “Foreword to Jean-François Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition*” in *The Ideologies of Theory* (London, New York, Verso, 2008) 254.

⁶ *Beyond the Limits*, Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers (Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 1993). And *Limits to Growth, the 30th Year Update*, Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers (Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004).

⁷ Jean-François Lyotard’s *Libidinal Economy* (Bloomington,

Indiana University Press, 1993) is up for the same title though. In contrast, Marx should be credited as the author of its first modern chapter.

⁸ “And if we put forward desire as a revolutionary agency, it is because we believe that capitalist society can endure many manifestations of interest, but not one manifestation of desire, which would be enough to make its fundamental structures explode, even at the kindergarten level. We believe in desire as in the irrational of every form of rationality, and not because it is a lack, a thirst, or an aspiration, but because it is the production of desire: desire that produces—real-desire, or the real in itself.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983) 379.

⁹ Beyond the capture of escaping revolutionary forms, financialization, from the dot.com bubble to the transference of the 2008 mortgage crisis to an investment on national foreign debts, has made absolutely transparent how exogamy constitutes the skeleton of neoliberalism’s contract with the virtual.

¹⁰ “Capitalism is not a totalizable system defined by the commodity form as a specifiable mode of production, determinately negated by proletarian class-consciousness. It is a convergent unrealizable assault upon the social macropod, whose symptom is the collapse of productive mode or form in the direction of ever more incomprehensible experiments in commodification, enveloping, dismantling, and circulating every subjective space. It is always on the move towards a terminal nonspace, melting the earth onto the body without organs, and generating what is ‘not a promised and pre-existing land, but a world created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization. Capital is not an essence but a tendency (...)’” The quote is from Nick Land (“Machinic Desire” in *Fanged Noumena*, Falmouth/New York, Urbanomic/Sequence Press, 2011, 339). If this review is an exercise in retrospection, retrospectively it is almost impossible not to collapse the ‘revolutionary capitalism’ reading Nick Land makes of *Anti-Oedipus* with the 1972 book itself.

¹¹ “And that is indeed what undermines capitalism: where will the revolution come from, and in what form *within* the exploited masses? It is like death—where, when? It will be a decoded flow, a deterritorialized flow that runs too far and cuts too sharply, thereby escaping from the axiomatic of capitalism. Will it come in the person of a Castro, an Arab, a Black Panther, or a Chinaman on the horizon? A May '68, a home-grown Maoist planted like an anchorite on a factory smokestack? Always the addition of an axiom to seal off a breach that has been discovered; fascist colonels start reading Mao, we won't be fooled again; Castro has become impossible, even in relation to himself; vacuoles are isolated, ghettos created; unions are appealed to for help; the most sinister forms of "dissuasion" are invented; the repression of interest is reinforced—but where will the new irruption of desire come from?” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 1983, 378.

¹² Nick Land, “Making it with Death” in *Fanged Noumena*, 2011, 265.

¹³ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 1983, 239–321.

¹⁴ At this point it is relevant to distinguish the major tools set forth for the revolutionary in *Anti-Oedipus* besides accelerationism, and see if schizoanalysis can indeed live beyond it without falling back on psychoanalysis, the other two being closer to Foucault’s liking, to wit: (self-) knowledge of the connectivity of desiring flows in their phasing in and out from molarity to molecularity; and the struggle for omni- rather than multiculturalism.

¹⁵ They had seen nothing yet!

¹⁶ If capitalism is being constrained by old forms of law (think of copyright) one needs to accelerate its tendency to break way from it (in order to set loose new communitarian market modalities, to keep with the case of copyright). Obliquely, communism may be verging on

us, and if so one must accelerate towards it. But one must always keep in mind that this is the same tendency that is increasingly dematerializing finance. How to differentiate them then, not theoretically but in practice?

17 Nick Land, "Meltdown" in *Fanged Noumena*, 2011, 452.

18 Nick Land, idem, 442; and Nick Land, "Circuitries" in *Fanged Noumena*, 2011, 317.

19 Idem.

20 This can take the form of either militarization or marketing. Militarization is the form of exterior capitalization or territorial dominance; marketing that of the capitalist twist of expansion towards the biological and psychological molecularity of individuals. The former is no longer contrived to energy supply zones such as the Middle East or Latin America, but is becoming standard procedure in city streets worldwide in the deployment of militarized police against the rights of citizens to strike, occupy and protest. In contrast, though in concordance, marketing targets and controls these desperate body-citizens (if they ever become so) as a biopolitical source of energy, both the most valuable and most dispensable in an overpopulated world, waiting for the emergence of their desires to simultaneously regulate and deregulate them through social networking and the individualization of technology.

21 Nick Land, "Machinic Desire" in *Fanged Noumena*, 2011, 341.

22 Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* was groundbreaking in this respect, but one can presume it was mostly incomprehensible to the first class of the St. Gallen, and anyway the full development of its influence on the two philosophers themselves would have to wait until their 1980 *A Thousand Plateaus*. Yet incomprehensible does not imply unread.

23 The University of St. Gallen has again been ranked number one for post-graduate education in management by The Financial Times, and is definitely the top business school in the German speaking world. For the latest update of the model see Johannes Rüeegg-Stürm, *The New St. Gallen Management Model* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

24 See for example Brian Massumi, "National Enterprise Emergency: Steps Toward an Ecology of Power" in *Theory Culture Society*, 26 (2009) 153.

25 Markus Schwaninger, "System Theory and Cybernetics: A solid basis for transdisciplinarity in management education and research" *Kybernetes*, Vol. 30, Issue 9/10 (2001) 1209–1222.

26 Juergen Spickers, *The Development of the "St. Gallen Management Model" at the Institute of Management at the University of St. Gallen*, accessed April 20, 2010, <http://www.ifb.unisg.ch/org/ifb/ifbweb.nsf/wwwPubInhalteEng/Institute?opendocumentand>. Also, Johannes Rüeegg-Stürm, *The New St. Gallen Management Model, Basic Categories of an Approach to Integrated Management* (2005) iv.

27 "To address the natural environment as part of managerial concern was at that time not only innovative but even revolutionary. The model's incorporation of environmental concerns showed great foresight and far-reaching consequences emanated from it." Markus Schwaninger, "System Theory and Cybernetics: A solid basis for transdisciplinarity in management education and research" (2001) 1209-1222. In fact, Aurelio Peccei (from The Club of Rome), and Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers (from *The Limits to Growth* team) were guests lecturers at the school.

28 W.R. Ashby, *An Introduction to Cybernetics* (Wiley, New York, 1956).

29 This interpretative quality of the St. Gallen Management Model has only been fully elucidated in the latest revision of the original 1972 framework. See Johannes Rüeegg-Stürm, *The New St. Gallen Management Model, Basic Categories of an Approach to Integrated Management* (2005).

30 Michael Flaschka, *The St. Gallen Management Model*, University of St. Gallen (1996).

31 Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Heinz Von Foerster and Ernst Von Glasersfeld were all guests at the school at one point or another.

32 In a certain sense, this corporatisation of ecological theories also helped to accelerate the fall of ecological utopias during the decades that followed. Historically, the answers to such technification was either philosophical reclusion or, in contrast, a narrowing exchange of ecological metaphysics for an hands-on environmentalist struggle.